The classic theory of spatial attention hypothesized 2 modes, voluntary and involuntary. Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) reported that even involuntary attention capture by stimuli requires a match between stimulus properties and what the observer is looking for. This surprising conclusion has been confirmed by many subsequent studies. In these studies, however, the observer typically looks for the same property throughout an entire session. Real-world behavior, in contrast, often requires frequent shifts in attentional set. The present study examined whether such shifts weaken attentional settings, allowing task-irrelevant objects to capture attention. Surprisingly, fluctuating control settings did not increase vulnerability to capture by salient stimuli (color singletons and abrupt onsets). We conclude that the attention control system is remarkably flexible, able to rapidly and fully adopt new settings and abandon old settings.
Because spatial attention is critical for the processing of visual objects, it is important to understand how spatial attention is controlled (see Ruz & Lupiáňez, 2002; Yantis, 2000 , for a review). Posner (1980) proposed that attention was controlled through two distinct modes, which he called endogenous and exogenous, and other theorists have made similar distinctions (e.g., Bundesen, 1990; Cave & Wolf, 1990; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Jonides, 1981) . One hypothesized mode is voluntary direction of attention (top-down or goal-driven control of attention; Posner's endogenous mode), and the other hypothesized mode is involuntary capture of attention by new stimuli or changes in stimuli (bottom-up or stimulus-driven control of attention; Posner's exogenous mode).
For several decades, research appeared to suggest that endogenous and exogenous attention shifts differed cleanly in their susceptibility to "top-down" control. Top-down control was assumed to be restricted to endogenous attention shifts and was assigned no role in exogenous attention shifts. This scheme aligned sensibly with Posner's hypothesis that exogenous control was quasireflexive in nature and operated through rapid neural loops not involving higher cognition. Furthermore, it was supported empirically by early reports that certain salient stimuli (such as abrupt onsets or feature singletons) have the power to involuntarily capture visual attention regardless of any top-down attentional control settings for other features (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992 Theeuwes, , 1994 Yantis, 1993; Yantis & Jonides, 1984) . This conclusion was, however, challenged by Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) . They found that even classic exogenous "trigger stimuli," such as abrupt onsets (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988) , failed to capture attention unless observers happened to be set to look for them. Therefore, Folk et al. proposed the contingent capture hypothesis, which asserts that involuntary attentional capture is contingent on a match between the properties of a potential capturing stimulus and current topdown attentional control settings. This surprising conclusion has since been confirmed by many studies using a wide variety of stimulus properties (for a review, see Ruz & Lupiáňez, 2002) .
Despite many studies supporting contingent capture, there is reason to question its generality. From an evolutionary standpoint, it would appear that organisms need to balance the advantages of top-down control with the advantages of responding quickly to unexpected stimuli (such as abrupt onsets or new objects) that might signal danger or opportunity. Anecdotal accounts of capture in everyday life, such as unwanted attention to flashing banner ads on the Internet, also suggest limits to the generality of the contingent capture hypothesis. Perhaps previous contingent capture research has overlooked common factors or conditions, prevalent in the real world, under which the more traditional view of purely exogenous involuntary capture might still be correct. The present study explores one promising possibility.
Most previous capture studies have used designs in which participants look for the same target-defining feature (e.g., a red stimulus) for hundreds of trials in a row. In this design, the to-be-looked-for target feature is always task relevant while other features are always task irrelevant. Such paradigms allow the use of stable, long-term attention control settings that might be especially favorable for attracting attention to task-relevant stimuli and preventing capture by task-irrelevant stimuli. In many real-world settings, however, attention control settings fluctuate frequently. For instance, carpentry can involve frequent switching attention among boards, nails, and the hammerhead, and factory workers assembling objects from multiple components must cyclically attend to the defining features of a variety of components. Under such commonplace but challenging conditions, attentional control settings for momentarily relevant features might be weak, and coexist with residual settings for a variety of recently attended-to (but momentarily irrelevant) stimulus features. Alternatively, in keeping with a strong version of the contingent capture hypothesis, newly established attentional settings might be just as powerful as long-term settings.
To test these hypotheses, we examined whether the requirement to frequently change attentional control settings renders people's attention much more susceptible to capture by salient stimuli that are momentarily task irrelevant (but which might have recently been task relevant). Before discussing the details of our approach, we will first review in more depth the evidence for the two competing hypotheses about involuntary attentional capture: the more traditional capture-by-salient-stimuli view, and the contingent capture view.
Involuntary Attentional Capture
Early work by Jonides and Yantis (1988) provided evidence that an abrupt onset can attract attention involuntarily to its location. In their study, participants searched for a prespecified target letter in a visual search array. One object in the display could appear as an abrupt onset, color singleton, or intensity singleton. As the display size increased from 2 to 4, they found a corresponding increase in response time (RT) when the target letter was a color or intensity singleton, but not when it was an abrupt onset. They argued that the abrupt onset captured attention involuntarily, so that it was usually the first object to be processed (see also Yantis & Egeth, 1999; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994) . Theeuwes (1991; see also 1992 , 1994 later provided further evidence that attentional capture can be driven by stimulus salience. In a series of visual-search experiments, Theeuwes (1991) had participants indicate whether a target line segment was horizontal or vertical. Some participants were to respond to the line segment appearing inside a circle with a unique color (e.g., a green circle among many red circles), whereas others responded to the line segment inside a circle with a unique intensity (e.g., a highintensity circle among many low-intensity circles). In one condition, there was no other unique object in the display. In another condition, one of the distractor circles had a unique feature in the irrelevant dimension; when searching for a color singleton, for instance, the display might also contain an irrelevant-intensity singleton. In a third condition, two of the circles contained a unique value on the relevant dimension (e.g., participants looking for a color singleton would see two red circles among many green circles); they knew which circle was the target based on whether it contained a line segment that was horizontal or vertical (the other circle contained a tilted line). The critical finding was that in both the color and intensity conditions, RT was slower in the presence of an irrelevant singleton in a nontarget location. He argued that attentional capture depends strongly on the relative salience of stimuli displayed in the visual field; attention initially orients to the most salient object, regardless of whether or not it is task relevant. Other studies have also reported that the presence of a salient but irrelevant singleton can interfere with target search, further supporting the capture-by-salient-stimuli view (e.g., Hickey, McDonald, & Theeuwes, 2006; Kim & Cave, 1999) .
Although salient objects clearly captured attention in these studies, it can be disputed whether the capture was unsupported by top-down settings. In Theeuwes's visual search paradigm, for instance, the target always occurred within a unique object in the display, perhaps encouraging participants to look generically for singleton objects. In fact, it has been proposed that the visual system can be set to quickly respond to any unique element that differs from background elements (known as singleton detection mode; see e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Lamy & Egeth, 2003 ; but see also Theeuwes, 2004) . If participants were induced by task demands to have an attentional setting favoring singletons, Theeuwes's (1991) results do not argue convincingly against the contingent capture hypothesis.
The contingent capture hypothesis grew out of experiments measuring the extent to which involuntary attentional capture depends on how well a potential attention-attracting stimulus matches what observers are looking for. Folk et al. (1992) used a paradigm in which a target, presented in one of four possible target locations (marked by boxes), was preceded by a noninformative display containing salient stimuli. This salient stimulus was called a cue, although it contained no information about the location or identity of the target. The key question was whether the cue stimulus, despite being noninformative, would capture attention based on its salience. Attention capture was indexed by whether RT to the target was faster when the cue stimulus appeared in the same location as the upcoming target, rather than in a different location (the cuing validity effect). Folk et al. tested two types of cues: abrupt onset cues (white dots appearing abruptly around one of the four target locations), and color cues (sets of dots surrounded all four target locations, but only one set was red). They also tested two target conditions: onset targets (a single white "X" or "ϭ" appeared in one box), and color targets (characters appeared in each box, but only one character was colored red). The key finding was that significant cuing validity effects-evidence of attentional capture-were found only when the cue type and target type matched. In other words, onset cues captured attention if and only if participants were looking for an onset target, and color cues captured attention if and only if participants were looking for a color target. Gibson and Jiang (1998) further bolstered the contingent capture hypothesis with their finding that an unexpected and irrelevant color singleton did not capture attention in a visual-search paradigm (for further evidence supporting the contingent capture view, see e.g., Atchley, Kramer, & Hillstrom, 2000; Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998 Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994; Gibson & Amelio, 2000; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998; Lien, Ruthruff, Goodin, & Remington, 2008; Pashler, 2001; Yantis & Egeth, 1999) . These studies converge on the conclusion that stimulus salience, by itself, is not sufficient to produce capture. Capture requires a match between the stimulus and attentional control settings.
Despite the growing number of studies supporting the contingent capture hypothesis, one important limitation of these studies has not yet been addressed. In a typical laboratory study demon-strating contingent attentional capture, the to-be-looked-for target feature (e.g., the red target) is fixed throughout the entire experiment. Perhaps it is only under these extreme-arguably even artificial-laboratory conditions that the top-down setting for a specific target-defining feature is strong enough to prevent attentional capture by irrelevant salient objects. Capture based on salience alone could still be the norm under real-world conditions where it is commonplace to juggle a variety of task goals with fluctuating attentional settings. Every day, people alternate between activities like drinking coffee, reading the newspaper, conversing with a spouse, checking the clock time, and so forth. Beyond that, we have already noted that many individual tasks, such as object assembly, require cycling attention among multiple components. The challenge is to determine empirically whether the contingent capture hypothesis generalizes to such important, but rarely studied, conditions.
The Present Study
The primary goal of this present study was to examine whether rapidly changing attentional control settings make the attentional system more vulnerable to capture by salient but irrelevant stimuli. A secondary goal was to assess whether the ability of relevant stimuli to capture attention is diminished when attention control settings are temporary and not yet strongly instantiated. We assessed capture for the two most commonly studied types of salient stimuli: abrupt onsets and color singletons.
As shown in Figure 1 , our displays contained four peripheral boxes, equidistant from a central fixation box. In the target display, the four peripheral boxes contained two "Ls" and two "Ts," one of which was drawn in the target color, and one of which was drawn in the distractor color. Participants were to find the letter in the target color and indicate whether it was a T or an L by pressing a Figure 1 . An example event sequence for the valid condition in Experiment 1. In the real experiment, the singleton box was colored. In this example cue display, the top left box was colored red, whereas the others were colored white. In the target display, the letter was colored red in the top left box, green in the top right box, and white in the other two boxes. corresponding key. Because there are multiple colors in the target display, optimal performance requires the establishment of a topdown control setting for a specific color (singleton search would be ineffective).
The key to our method is that the target color varied from trial-to-trial, which required that the target color be announced at the beginning of each trial. We did not want to use color (hue) itself as a prompt, to avoid unwanted stimulus priming or a shallow search strategy of hue matching. Instead, we used a letter code: "R" for red, "G" for green, and "B" for blue. Use of an arbitrary, culture-based code ensures that we are tapping into a relatively high-level top-down voluntary setting of attention, not some recency effect within early vision. We will refer to the prompt display of the letter code for the color of the upcoming target as simply the prompt. This terminology deliberately avoids calling it a task cue because that word has already been reserved (by previous studies on attentional control) for the stimulus whose ability to capture attention is being assessed.
Each trial began with the aforementioned prompt display. Next, we presented a cue display containing a salient stimulus that might capture attention. The term cue usually refers to a stimulus that provides information about the target, but in the capture literature this term is used even for noninformative stimuli that participants probably do not try to utilize. Our cues appeared randomly in the four locations and thus provided no information about any aspect of the upcoming target letter, including its location. As an index of the extent to which cue type capture attention, we used the cuing validity effect-the amount by which RT declined when the cue location matched the target location.
Experiment 1 established a baseline for the amount of attentional capture when top-down control settings do not change from trial-to-trial, as in most previous studies. Experiment 2 varied the to-be-looked-for target color across trials according to an alternating-runs sequence (AABB). Experiments 3 and 4 varied the to-be-looked-for target color randomly from trial to trial (announced by a prompt at the beginning of each trial).
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, each participant looked for the same target color throughout the entire experiment (red, green, or blue) and ignored the same distractor color throughout the entire experiment. At the beginning of each trial, a prompt announced the color of the target. Although this prompt is unnecessary with a fixed target color, the use of the prompt helped to better match the procedure of subsequent experiments, in which the target color varied.
After the prompt, a cue display appeared, containing a salient stimulus (a color singleton or an abrupt onset) that could potentially capture attention. The color singleton could be red, green, or blue. When the color singleton matched the target color for that trial we call it a target-color singleton. When the color singleton matched the color of the distractor (to be ignored) in the target display, we call it a distractor-color singleton. When the color singleton appeared in the neutral color, which never appeared in the target display, we call it a neutral-color singleton. An additional type of cue display contained an abrupt onset. All of these cues were intended to be salient, but only the target-color singletons fit the property used to find targets, so we will refer to this property as task relevant. The other three cue types (distractorcolor singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset) did not match the property used to find targets, so we will refer to them as task irrelevant.
If salient stimuli have the power to capture attention regardless of top-down attentional settings, then cuing validity effects should be observed in all cue conditions (whether task relevant or task irrelevant). However, if attentional capture is contingent on topdown attentional settings, then the cuing validity effects should be found only when the cue stimuli match the to-be-looked-for target color (task relevant).
Method
Participants. Sixty undergraduate students from Oregon State University and the University of New Mexico participated in exchange for extra course credit. All had normal or corrected-tonormal visual acuity and color vision.
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimuli were presented on IBMcompatible microcomputers. The average viewing distance was about 55 cm. Within each trial, four visual displays were presented in succession (see Figure 1) . The fixation display consisted of five boxes: a center box surrounded by four peripheral boxes placed at the corners of an imaginary square (top left, bottom left, top right, and bottom right). Each peripheral box was equidistant from the center box (7.66°, center to center) and from adjacent peripheral boxes (10.81°, center to center). Each box was 2.39°ϫ 2.39°, drawn with thin (0.10°) white lines.
The second display was the prompt display, announcing the color of the upcoming target to be identified. The prompt display consisted of the fixation display with a white letter "R," "G," or "B" (for red, green, and blue, respectively) in the center box. The letter, in Arial font, was 1.04°in width, 1.35°in length, and 0.12°t hick.
The third display was the cue display. This display was similar to the fixation display, except that either (1) one of the peripheral boxes was colored red, green, or blue, or (2) four white dots appeared abruptly around one of the boxes (in a diamond configuration). The dots were 1.04°in diameter and were placed 0.31°f rom the edge of the box.
The fourth stimulus event was the target display, consisting of the fixation display plus the addition of a letter inside each of the four peripheral boxes. Each hemifield (left vs. right visual field) contained one T and one L. One of the four letters was drawn in the target color, one was drawn in the distractor color, and the other two were white (the target color and the distractor color always appeared in different hemifields). The letters, in Arial font, were 1.04°in width, 1.35°in length, and 0.12°thick. Design and procedure. As shown in Figure 1 , each trial began with the presentation of the fixation display for 1,000 ms. Then, a prompt display (announcing the to-be-looked-for color of the upcoming target) appeared for 1,200 ms, followed by the cue display (containing the cue stimulus that might or might not capture attention) for 50 ms. The fixation display then reappeared for 100 ms, followed by the target display for 50 ms. Thus, the interval between cue onset and target onset was 150 ms. The fixation display then reappeared once again and remained on the screen until participants made a response. Auditory tone feedback (100 ms) followed incorrect responses, whereas silence (100 ms) followed correct responses. Immediately after the feedback, the next trial began with the 1,000-ms fixation display.
Three colors were used: red, green, and blue. For each participant, one color was assigned to be the target color. Another color was assigned to be the distractor color (which always appeared in the target display). The remaining color (i.e., the neutral color) never appeared in the target display but sometimes appeared in the cue display. For each participant in Experiment 1, the target color, distractor color, and neutral color were constant throughout the entire experiment. Across participants, color assignments were counterbalanced. Equal numbers of participants received each of the six possible assignments of colors to the target, distractor, and neutral color (red-green-blue, red-blue-green, green-red-blue, green-blue-red, blue-red-green, and blue-green-red, respectively).
On each trial, one of four types of cue displays appeared: a target-color singleton, a distractor-color singleton, a neutral-color singleton, or an abrupt onset. Note that comparison of results with distractor-color versus neutral-color singletons provides a test of whether the ability of a color singleton to capture attention depends on whether it needs to be actively selected against in the target display (needed for the distractor color but not the neutral color).
One of the four types of cue displays was selected randomly for each trial, subject to the restriction that each occur equally often (25% of trials) within each block and that each cue appear equally often in each of the four peripheral boxes. These cues did not reliably predict the target location (25% valid and 75% invalid, with four locations).
Participants were instructed to press the C key of a standard keyboard, which was labeled L, with their left index finger when they saw the target letter L, and to press the B key, which was labeled T, with their right index finger when they saw the target letter T. They were asked to respond quickly and accurately. They performed one practice block of 32 trials, followed by eight experimental blocks of 64 trials each (a total of 512 experimental trials). After each block, a summary of mean RT and accuracy were displayed, and participants were encouraged to take a short break. The next block began only when participants pressed a key to continue.
Results
Trials were excluded from analysis if RT was less than 100 ms or greater than 2,000 ms (0.12% of trials). Error trials and trials immediately after an error trial were excluded from RT analyses. Table 1 shows, for retained trials, the mean RT and proportion of error (PE). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on these data, with the factors of cue type (target-color singleton, distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset), and cuing validity (valid vs. invalid). The p values were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction for nonsphericity, where appropriate. An alpha level of .05 was set for determining statistical significance.
For the RT data, RT was 21 ms slower when the cue invalidly cued the target location (560 ms) than when it validly cued the target location (539 ms), F(1, 59) ϭ 69.78, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .54. The main effect of cue type was not significant, F Ͻ 1.0. As expected, however, it did interact significantly with validity, F(3, 177) ϭ 41.98, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .42; cuing validity effects were much greater for the target-color (i.e., task-relevant) singleton. Follow-up analyses of simple main effects for each cue type showed that the cuing validity effect was significant for the targetcolor singleton (56 ms), F(1, 59) ϭ 162.58, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .73. Although the cuing validity effect was relatively small for the distractor-color singleton, the neutral-color singleton, and the abrupt onset (9 ms for each), it was still significant in each case, Fs(1, 59) Ն 4.45, ps Ͻ .05, p 2 s Յ .12 (see Figure 2 ). The PE data were consistent with the RT data. PE was .016 higher for invalid cues (.079) than for valid cues (.063), F(1, 59) ϭ 23.29, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .28. As in the RT data, the main effect of cue type was not significant, F Ͻ 1.0, but it interacted significantly with validity, F(3, 177) ϭ 5.35, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .08. Simple main effect analyses for each cue type revealed that the cuing validity effect was significant only for the target-color singleton (.038), F(1, 59) ϭ 34.38, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .37, and for the distractor-color singleton (.014), F(1, 59) ϭ 4.75, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .07. The validity effects on PE were only .010, and .004 for the neutral-color singleton and abrupt onset, respectively, Fs(1, 59) Յ 2.38, ps Ն .1279, p 2 s Յ .04.
Discussion
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to establish a baseline for the amount of capture produced by different types of salient objects with fixed attentional control settings. Thus, we adopted the standard methodology used in previous capture studies-each participant was to look for only one particular target color (red, green, or blue) throughout the entire experiment. Because the target display always contained letters with one target color and one distractor color, accurate performance required the top-down establishment of attentional settings for the target color (i.e., the use of singleton search or onset search would not be effective). The cuing validity effect for the task-irrelevant cues (9 ms) was statistically significant, suggesting that these stimuli were able to capture attention, albeit weakly. Critically, however, we found that cuing validity effects (evidence of capture) were much stronger for Note. In Experiment 1, the target-defining feature (e.g., red color target) was fixed and therefore repeated on every trial.
cues that matched the current attentional control settings (56 ms) than for those that did not (9 ms), Fs(1, 59) Ն 56.81, ps Ͻ .0001, p 2 s Յ .64. This finding is consistent with previous attentional capture studies arguing for contingent capture (e.g., Folk et al., 1992) .
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the top-down attentional settings were fixed, just as in previous attentional capture studies. Experiment 2 was designed to examine (a) whether people can rapidly change their attentional control settings, and (b) whether this change increases the vulnerability to capture by salient stimuli. Each participant was required to switch between two potential target colors, with the third color serving as a neutral color. For example, a participant with red and green letters in the target display would switch between responding to red and responding to green; for such a participant, blue would be the neutral color (sometimes appearing in the cue display but never in the target display). The color assignments were counterbalanced across participants.
We used an alternating-runs paradigm (AABB; e.g., red-redgreen-green). Thus, the target-defining color sometimes repeated and sometimes switched. As in Experiment 1, the target-definingfeature prompt for the upcoming trial was a white letter (e.g., R for red and G for green). Again, the critical issue is the degree to which different types of salient stimuli capture attention.
If changing attentional control settings render the attentional system more vulnerable to capture by salient but irrelevant stimuli, then large cuing validity effects should be obtained not only for the task-relevant cue (i.e., the target-color singleton), but also for the task-irrelevant cues (i.e., the distractor-color singleton, neutralcolor singleton, and abrupt onset). This pattern seems especially likely on switch trials, when one might expect a weaker set for the new target-defining feature and a residual set for the previous target-defining feature. However, if attentional settings can be quickly and completely reconfigured in response to an abstract cue, then only the target-color singleton should strongly capture attention, regardless of whether the target color switches or repeats.
Method
Participants. There were 72 new participants, drawn from the same participant pool as in Experiment 1. None had participated in the previous experiment. All had normal color vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The tasks, stimuli, and equipment were the same as in Experiment 1, with the exceptions noted below. Each participant was required to switch between two target colors in a repeating AABB sequence. When one of these two colors was assigned to be the target color, the other was assigned to be the distractor color in the target display. A third color was used as the neutral color, never appearing as a target or distractor in the target display. Thus, there were six possible color-assignment combinations, fully counterbalanced across participants. The four cue displays were intermixed within blocks, as in Experiment 1.
Results
The data analysis was similar to that of Experiment 1. Application of the RT cutoffs eliminated 0.52% of trials. Data were analyzed as a function of trial type (repetition vs. switch), cue type (relevant-color singleton, distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset), and cuing validity (valid vs. invalid). Table 2 shows the mean RT and PE for each of these conditions. An overall comparison of repeat vs. switch trials showed that there was a modest RT cost (41 ms) when the target-defining feature switched from the preceding trial (735 ms) relative to when it repeated (694 ms The main effect of cue type was not significant, F Ͻ 1.0. As expected, however, the interaction of cue type with cue validity was very strong and highly significant, F(3, 213) ϭ 14.09, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .17. As in Experiment 1, we conducted further data analyses for each cue type. For the target-color singleton, where the color singleton contained the target-defining color, the cuing validity effect was large (53 ms), F(1, 71) ϭ 73.38, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .51. The effect was not significantly different between repetition and switch trials (59 ms vs. 47 ms, respectively), F Ͻ 1.0. The cuing validity effect, however, was only 4 ms in the distractor-color singleton, F Ͻ 1.0; the effect did not differ between the repetition and switch conditions (6 ms vs. 1 ms, respectively), F Ͻ 1.0. There was a small but significant cuing validity effect (14 ms) for the neutral-color singleton, F(1, 71) ϭ 6.69, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .09. In this neutral-color singleton, the cuing effect was numerically larger for repetition trials (26 ms) than for switch trials (3 ms), although the effect only approached statistical significance, F(1, 71) ϭ 3.04, p ϭ .0858, p 2 ϭ .04. For the abrupt onset, the small cuing validity effect of 11 ms approached significance, F(1, 71) ϭ 2.98, p ϭ .0889, p 2 ϭ .04, with the effect being larger for repetition trials than for switch trials (22 ms vs. Ϫ1 ms, respectively), F(1, 71) ϭ 4.87, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .06 (see Figure 3) . No other effects were significant.
For the PE data analyses, PE was .026 higher when the targetdefining color switched from the preceding trial (.085) than when it repeated (.058) , F(1, 71) 
Discussion
Experiment 2 used alternating runs of target-defining colors (e.g., red-red-green-green, etc.) to examine (a) whether people can rapidly change their attentional control settings, and (b) whether this change increases the vulnerability to capture by salient stimuli. With regard to the first issue, the cost of switching the targetdefining color was only 41 ms on RT and .026 on PE. These costs are very modest compared to the 100ϩ ms costs usually found when people switch between two cognitive tasks with different stimulus-response mappings (e.g., letter and digit tasks; e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995) , suggesting that people can quickly and accurately change their attentional control settings. Consistent with this conclusion, cuing validity effects on RT for the task-relevant cue (53 ms) was similar to what we found with fixed attentional control settings in Experiment 1 (56 ms), and did not significantly different between the repeat and switch trials (59 ms vs. 47 ms, respectively). Thus, newly established control settings (after only 1,200 ms of preparation time) for a particular target color were sufficiently strong that a cue matching that color strongly captured attention, just as much as in previous studies with fixed attention control settings.
With regard to the second question, the data show little evidence that switching control settings made the attentional system more vulnerable to capture by salient-but-irrelevant stimuli. Attentional capture still depended strongly on the current attentional settings. The overall cuing validity effect (an evidence of attentional capture)-averaged across repetition and switch trials-was substantially larger for the task-relevant singleton cue (53 ms) than for the task-irrelevant cues (4, 14, and 11 ms, for the distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset, respectively). In fact, the cuing validity effects in the distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset averaged less than 20% of the cuing validity effect obtained in the relevant-color singleton. These results indicate that contingent capture applies even in the face of changing attentional control settings. Note that the average cuing validity effect across the three task-irrelevant cues was 10 ms, nearly identical to the 9-ms effect observed in Experiment 1 (with fixed attentional control settings). Thus, attentional capture to task-irrelevant stimuli was essentially identical with changing control settings and with fixed control settings.
Another way to examine this issue is to look for evidence that task-irrelevant stimuli captured attention more strongly after a switch in the target-defining color than after a repetition. If anything, the overall pattern is exactly the opposite: the average cuing validity effect for task-irrelevant cues (averaged across the distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset) was only 1 ms after a switch and was 18 ms after a repetition. It is especially interesting to examine capture for the distractorcolor singleton cue after a switch. In this condition, the singleton cue is the exact same color that was responded to on the previous trial (about 2 s ago). If the attentional control setting for one trial cannot be completely flushed, then this color should strongly capture attention on the next trial. Clearly, it did not. Again, the cuing validity effect for the distractor color was only 1 ms after a switch. This finding suggests an impressively quick and complete reconfiguration of the attentional control setting.
An unexpected finding is that the cuing validity effect was somewhat larger for repetition trials than for switch trials for both neutral-color singletons and abrupt onset stimuli (significantly so for abrupt onsets). One possible account of the modest reduction in the specificity of the attentional control setting on repetition trials is that participants relax the strength of top-down control. Specifically, responding to a target might strengthen the control setting for that target color, so that it becomes less necessary to exclude salient but irrelevant stimuli. Although this explanation is plausible and worthy of further research, it is post hoc. Furthermore, these results were not replicated in Experiment 3 with random sequences of target-defining colors.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 used a repeating AABB sequence. Thus, participants had foreknowledge of what the target-defining color would be. In such a design, participants might eventually fall into a rhythm rather than deliberately preparing for and establishing the attentional setting on each trial (e.g., Gotler, Meiran, & Tzelgov, 2003; Koch, 2003; Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006) . To encourage more deliberate preparation, Experiment 3 used a random sequence of target-defining colors. In other words, the targetdefining feature changed unpredictably on a trial-by-trial basis. Under these circumstances, participants had to process the targetdefining-feature prompt on each trial to set themselves to find that color in the target display. The control setting for the target color had to be programmed "on the fly" within a second or so of interpreting the prompt.
The random trial sequence ensured a heterogeneous mix of target-color switches and repetitions. Thus, as in Experiment 2, we can test whether it takes several trials to fully establish a new attentional setting. The random sequence also included numerous trials where the target color on the previous trial became a distractor color on the current trial, providing a strong test of how much hysteresis there is in attentional settings-that is, how much of a recent attentional setting still remains in force after it becomes irrelevant.
Method
Participants. There were 72 new participants, drawn from the same participant pool as in the previous experiments. None had participated in the previous experiments. All had normal visual acuity and color vision. As in Experiments 1 and 2, there were six different assignments of red, green, and blue to the target color, distractor color, and neutral color, counterbalanced across participants.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The tasks, stimuli, and equipment were the same as in Experiment 2, except that the sequence of target-defining colors was random. Again, we presented four types of cues, intermixed within blocks, as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results
The data analysis was similar to that of Experiment 2. Application of the RT cutoffs eliminated 0.95% of trials. Data were analyzed as a function of trial type (repetition vs. switch), cue type (target-color singleton, distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset), and cuing validity (valid vs. invalid). Table 3 shows the mean RT and PE for each of these conditions.
For the RT data, there was a cost on RT (29 ms) when the target-defining feature switched from the preceding trial (mean RT ϭ 707 ms) compared to when it repeated (mean RT ϭ 678 ms), F(1, 71) ϭ 52.24, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .42. This effect is similar in 2 ϭ .34. The cuing validity effect was not significantly different between the repetition (42 ms) and switch trials (44 ms), F Ͻ 1.0, replicating Experiment 2. The cuing validity effect was only Ϫ4, 5, and 3 ms for the distractor-color singleton, neutralcolor singleton, and abrupt onset, respectively, Fs Ͻ 1.0. The cuing validity effect was not significantly different between repetition and switch trials in any of these three cue types, Fs Ͻ 1.0 (see Figure 4) . No other effects were significant.
The PE data supported the RT analyses. There was a cost of switching the target-defining color (cost on PE ϭ .021) . .026, respectively), F Ͻ 1.0. The cuing validity effect, however, was only .004, Ϫ.001, and Ϫ.001 for the distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset types, respectively, Fs Ͻ 1.0. The cuing validity effect was not significantly different between repetition and switch trials in any of these three cue types, Fs Ͻ 1.0. No other effects on PE were significant.
Discussion
The results show that participants were able, to a surprising degree, to completely switch their attentional settings "on the fly" based on a prompt appearing only 1.2 s before the cue appeared. The amount of attentional capture (indexed by the cuing validity effect) by a task-relevant cue was substantial and similar in size for both repetition (42 ms) and switch (44 ms) trials. These numbers were also in the same general ballpark as the preceding experiments, although reduced by about 20%. This is not a major difference, especially considering that there might have been a noticeable number of trials where participants lapsed in processing the target-defining feature prompts.
Other aspects of the data confirm that participants were remarkably successful in reprogramming their attentional set to correspond to the prompt for the current trial. Cuing effects for each of the three task-irrelevant cues were uniformly small. For the six task-irrelevant cue conditions shown in Table 3 (both repetition Figure 4 . Mean response times (in milliseconds) in Experiment 3 as a function of trial type (repetition and switch) and cuing validity (valid and invalid) for the target-color singleton, distractor-color singleton, neutralcolor singleton, and abrupt onset. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. and switch for the distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onset), the mean cuing validity effect was no larger than 10 ms in any single condition and averaged only 2 ms. This is an astounding tribute to participants' ability to set their attention for the current target-defining feature, with negligible hysteresis from the previous setting. It is even more impressive if one again considers the likelihood that participants occasionally lapsed in processing the target-defining feature prompts.
As in Experiment 2, we also looked for evidence that salientbut-irrelevant stimuli captured attention more easily after a switch in attentional setting than after a repetition. In fact, the mean cuing validity effect for salient-but-irrelevant stimuli was negligible both after a switch (2 ms) and after a repetition (1 ms). A particularly striking finding comes from the distractor-color singleton where the distractor-color singleton actually matched the attentional setting of the preceding trial. Results from this condition show that the cuing validity effect had a mean of Ϫ2 ms, providing no evidence for any hysteresis of the attentional setting utilized only 2 s earlier.
Experiment 4
In Experiments 2 and 3, participants switched between responding to two different features within the color dimension (e.g., red to green). Because the target display always contained both of the potential target colors, it provided no hint as to the relevant color. Thus, the task required executive control to put in place the attentional set for the target color; failure to do so would have resulted in a very high error rate (50%). Empirically, however, it seems that switching between two features within the same dimension was relatively easy for our participants, producing switch costs of only 41 ms in Experiment 2 and 29 ms in Experiment 3. These costs are a mere fraction of those found in traditional task-switching studies (100ϩ ms; see e.g., Roger & Monsell, 1995) , where people switch between two tasks with different stimulus-response mapping rules (e.g., an odd/even task on a digit vs. a less-than/greater-than five task on a digit).
Therefore, Experiment 4 was designed to examine the vulnerability to capture under the much more difficult type of switching in which the tasks use different stimulus-response mapping rules. To simplify the design, Experiment 4 included only the target-color singleton and distractor-color singleton conditions and only red and green target colors. To create two different mapping rules on a single set of stimuli, we adopted two digit tasks: the parity task (even or odd), and the size task (less than or greater than five). These tasks have been used in numerous task-switching studies. Half of participants were asked to perform the parity task on the red digit and the size task on the green digit; the other half received the opposite assignment. Thus, participants switched not only the target-defining property (as in Experiments 2 and 3) but also the stimulus-response mapping rule.
We expect this experiment to produce a relatively large switch cost, similar to traditional task-switching studies. The critical question, however, is whether switching between two different stimulus-response mapping rules makes the attentional system vulnerable to capture by task-irrelevant objects. If it does, then substantial cuing validity effects should be obtained for the taskirrelevant cues.
Method
Participants. There were 48 new participants, drawn from the same participant pool as in the previous experiments. None had participated in the previous experiments. All had normal visual acuity and color vision. There were two different assignments of red and green targets to the parity and size tasks, counterbalanced across participants.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 3, with the exceptions noticed below. Only the target-color singleton and the distractor-color singleton conditions were used, with the colors red and green. Instead of presenting four letters (two Ls and 2 Ts) in the target display, we presented four digits. The digits (one-nine, except five) were randomly selected with the restriction that no two digits in a display were the same. One of the digits was drawn in the target color and one was drawn in the distractor color, whereas the other two were white. As in Experiment 3, the sequence of target-defining prompts (R for the red digit and G for the green digit) was random. One half of the participants were asked to perform the parity task (odd or even) for the red digit and the size task (less than five or greater than five) for the green digit. The other half of the participants received the opposite color-to-task assignment.
Results
The data analysis was similar to that of Experiment 3. Application of the RT cutoffs eliminated 4.66% of trials. Data were analyzed as a function of trial type (repetition vs. switch), cue type (target-color singleton and distractor-color singleton), and cuing validity (valid vs. invalid). Table 4 shows the mean RT and PE for each of these conditions.
For the RT data, there was a cost on RT (137 ms) when the target set switched from the preceding trial (mean RT ϭ 952 ms) than when it repeated (mean RT ϭ 815 ms) , F(1, 47) The cuing validity effect for the distractor-color singleton was not significantly different for the repetition and switch trials, F Ͻ 1.0 (see Figure 5 ). For the PE data, the only significant effect was the main effect of task transition, F(1, 47) ϭ 42.64, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ 0.52; the switch cost was .040. No other effects were significant.
Discussion
In Experiment 4, we asked participants to switch between targetdefining colors and switch between different stimulus-response mapping rules. This kind of switching is much more demanding than switching target-defining colors alone (i.e., Experiments 2 and 3), as evidenced by the marked increase in switch costs (137 ms vs. 35 ms) and overall RT (884 ms vs. 704 ms). The main question was whether this more difficult kind of switching would make the attentional system more vulnerable to capture by irrelevant objects. Surprisingly, it did not. The cuing validity effect for salient-but-irrelevant stimuli approached zero both after a switch (Ϫ10 ms) and after a repetition (Ϫ5 ms). The absence of validity effects on switch trials is especially remarkable given that the distractor-color singleton always matched the attentional setting established on the immediately preceding trial (within 2 s).
Although the distractor-color singleton did not capture attention, the target-color singleton did. In fact, the cuing validity effect (49 ms) fell squarely within the range obtained in Experiments 2 and 3 (42 to 59 ms). In addition, the cuing validity effect was not noticeably reduced on switch trials (47 ms) compared to repetition trials (50 ms). These findings indicate that participants were able to successfully and completely upload the new attentional set, while discarding the previous attention set, even while simultaneously burdened by the need to establish a different stimulusresponse mapping rule.
General Discussion
The present study examined whether visual attention control settings based on task goals are as effective when they change frequently (every few seconds) as when they remain stable over extended time periods (an hour or so). One can easily imagine that frequent changes would yield weaker control settings, possibly containing a residue of other settings recently in force. To our knowledge, this question has not been previously investigated using modern attention control paradigms. Subquestions include whether rapidly changing settings (a) reduce capture by stimuli that do match what people intend to look for, or (b) increase capture by salient stimuli that do not match what people intend to look for. With regard to the latter subquestion, we further distinguish between salient stimuli that match recently used attention control settings (that might still remain in force) and those that do not.
Following many previous attention-capture studies, we displayed cues in random locations, providing no information about the location of the upcoming target (25% valid vs. 75% invalid, with four possible locations). Although there was no incentive to voluntarily attend to the cues, they might capture attention involuntarily. If so, targets appearing in the cue location (valid cuing trials) should be responded to especially quickly compared to trials where the target and cue appear in different locations (invalid cuing trials). Therefore, this difference between RTs on valid and invalid trials-the cuing validity effect-provides an index of attentional capture by the cues.
Experiment 1 was designed to establish a quantitative baseline measurement of the attention control achieved with fixed control settings (e.g., always looking for a "red" target letter), indexed by the cuing validity effect. Each participant always looked for the same target color and always ignored the same distractor color, essentially replicating classic experiments on attentional capture. Color singleton cues matching the to-be-looked-for target color strongly captured attention, based on a substantial cuing validity effect of 56 ms. The cues that did not match this property (i.e., distractor-color singletons, neutral-color singletons, and abrupt onsets), however, produced only small, albeit statistically significant, cuing validity effects (9 ms). These results replicate the standard finding that attentional capture is strongly contingent upon a match between the cue and the current attentional control settings.
Experiment 2 varied attention control settings every few trials, following a repeating AABB sequence-participants looked for targets with a particular color on two consecutive trials and then switched to looking for a different target color. Note that, on switch trials, the to-be-looked-for target color on one trial became to-be-ignored distractor color on the next trial. Surprisingly, Experiment 2 showed that attentional control settings, despite changing frequently, exerted roughly the same high level of control of attention as they did with fixed settings in Experiment 1. In fact, the cuing validity effect for the target-color singleton condition in Experiment 2 was 53 ms, remarkably close to the 56-ms effect found in Experiment 1. Furthermore, the cuing validity effect was quite small when the cue stimulus did not match the to-be-lookedfor target color; the effect was only 4 ms, 14 ms, and 11 ms, respectively, for distractor-color singletons, neutral-color singletons, and abrupt onsets. These cuing validity effects, on average, are no greater than those found in Experiment 1 (9 ms). Thus, the strength of attention control was not noticeably diminished relative to when the to-be-looked-for target color was fixed for an entire session.
Similar findings were obtained in Experiment 3, which used a random sequence of target-defining colors. The cuing validity effect was 43 ms for the target-color singleton, but only Ϫ4 ms, 5 ms, and 3 ms for the distractor-color singleton, neutral-color singleton, and abrupt onsets, respectively. Furthermore, as shown in Table 3 , the cuing validity effects produced by salient stimuli that did not match the target color were no larger after a switch in target-defining color (2 ms) than after a repetition (2 ms). Thus, in Experiment 3 capture was once again overwhelmingly contingent on top-down control settings rather than stimulus salience.
Experiment 4 required an even more demanding kind of switching by asking participants to switch between target colors and between different stimulus-response mapping rules; for example, the parity task might be assigned to red digits and the size task to green digits. The cost of switching (137 ms) was much greater than in the previous experiments (35 ms), which required only a switch in target color. Nevertheless, the cuing validity effect was 49 ms for color singletons matching the to-be-looked-for target color, nearly as large as in the previous experiments. Moreover, very strikingly, the cuing validity effect was once again negligible for the three types of cues that did not match the target color (mean of Ϫ4 ms). Thus, even a very taxing form of switching failed to increase the vulnerability to capture by salient stimuli.
Pooled Analysis of Experiments 2 Through 4
To obtain a more precise measure of the effect of attention switching on capture, we conducted a pooled analysis of Experiments 1 through 4. For this purpose, we averaged the data across the three different types of cue stimuli that did not match the to-be-looked-for target color (sensible given the absence of large or systematic differences among these conditions). We conducted two complementary analyses.
In the first analysis, we asked whether the need to switch attentional settings (Experiment 2-4) might have increased capture for cues not matching the target color, relative to Experiment 1. To ensure an "apples to apples" comparison with Experiment 1 (which contained repetitions only), we used only the repetition trials from Experiments 2 through 4. Not only were the cuing validity effects in Experiments 2 through 4 (6 Ϯ 7 ms) not significantly greater than the Experiment 1 baseline (9 Ϯ 5 ms), the comparison was actually weakly in the opposite direction (F Ͻ 1.0). Expressed as a 95% confidence interval, the size of the increase in the cue validity effect from Experiment 1 to Experiments 2 to 4 was Ϫ3 Ϯ 5 ms. Thus, the present data, with a considerable sample size, surprisingly suggest that fluctuating attentional control settings produce no increase whatsoever in vulnerability to unwanted attention capture (by stimuli not matching attention control settings).
In a second analysis we asked whether, within Experiments 2 through 4, the attentional control system was more vulnerable to capture on switch trials than repeat trials. For cues that did not match the target color (singletons and abrupt onsets), the cuing validity effect was 6 Ϯ 7 ms for repetition trials and Ϫ1 Ϯ 8 ms for switch trials. Thus, the trend was actually for less capture on switch trials, although this difference was not statistically significant, F(1, 191) ϭ 2.23, p ϭ .1371, p 2 ϭ .02. Expressed as a 95% confidence interval, the "increase" in cuing validity effects in switch trials was Ϫ7 Ϯ 10 ms. Thus, again, the present data allow us to rule out all but the most miniscule increase in capture vulnerability (to stimuli not matching the target color) because of switching attention control settings. These findings confirm a remarkable ability of attention control settings to reach full strength virtually immediately (within about a second) after being set.
Parallel Search Versus Serial Search
There is a previous report in the literature (e.g., Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes, & Kramer, 2007) that capture by color singletons is more likely with a diffuse allocation of attention (parallel search) than with a focused allocation of attention (serial search). Although corroborating studies are needed to nail down this conclusion, it is nevertheless worth considering whether our paradigm (which is similar to the general paradigm used in the entire line of research spawned by Folk et al., 1992) encourages diffuse or focused attention.
An explicit goal of our design was to force participants to adopt an attentional set for a particular color. Accordingly, our target display always contained one red letter, one green letter, and two white letters. Previous studies using similar stimuli have provided evidence that search for an object in a particular color amongst a background of objects in other colors is typically a parallel search, producing relatively flat search slopes (e.g., Duncan, 1989, Experiment 1) . Nevertheless, because of the target color changed from trial to trial in our study, it is conceivable that, under these more demanding conditions, search for a target color could become serial.
To address this issue, we conducted an additional experiment in which we manipulated the setsize of the target display (2, 4, or 8) .
In this control experiment, we presented a fixation display of eight peripheral boxes and one center box, followed by the target display (there was no cue display). In the Setsize 2 condition, we presented only a red letter and a green letter, on opposite sides of the fixation. In the Setsize 4 condition, we again presented a red letter and a green letter on opposite sides and two additional white letters (one on each side). In the Setsize 8 condition, we presented a red letter, a green letter on opposite sides, and six additional white letters (three on each side) Although the main effect of setsize was significant, F(2, 106) ϭ 64.21, p Ͻ .0001, p 2 ϭ .55, the slope of RT against set size was quite shallow, increasing only 6 ms per item. This is well below the standard 30 ms or so per item typically found with straightforwardly "serial" searches, and consistent with previous findings reported for parallel search (e.g., Wolfe, 1998; Wolfe, Klempen, & Dahlen, 2000 ; even with parallel search, some increase in RT with setsize is to be expected). In addition, this effect of setsize on RT was not different between repetition and switch trials, F(2, 106) ϭ 1.49, p ϭ .2308, p 2 ϭ .03. For repetition trials, mean RTs were 665 ms, 690 ms, and 703 ms for the setsize of 2, 4, and 8, respectively. For switch trials, mean RTs were 701 ms, 735 ms, and 739 ms for the setsize of 2, 4, and 8, respectively. It seems that search was parallel both when the to-be-looked-for target color switched on a trial and when it repeated from the previous trial. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the general lack of capture by salient-but-mismatching cue stimuli in the present study is because of use of the serial search mode.
An Evolutionary Puzzle
Quite surprisingly, we found absolutely no evidence that fluctuating attentional control settings made the attentional system any more vulnerable to capture by salient stimuli (such as color singletons and abrupt onsets) that do not match the desired attention control settings. Nor is there much evidence that oscillating back and forth among a small number of attentional settings induces any residual setting favoring features that have frequently been looked for but are not currently being looked for. One might have thought that there would be a cumulative training effect such that frequently used attentional settings not currently in force would only settle back to an intermediate level of activation (analogous to memory strength accumulating for multiple items with intermingled practice, and not returning completely to zero for items not presented recently). Thinking in evolutionary terms, it is hard to believe that if you have been intermittently running away from tigers for the last hour, but are currently drinking at a pond with your attention on the properties of the water, your attention system no longer cares about tiger stimuli. We believe that this amounts to an evolutionary puzzle, and it is certainly worth additional attempts to find laboratory conditions other than those tested here under which attention control by longer term task relevance (as opposed to current relevance) could be demonstrated.
Perhaps recently used settings would show more persistence if those settings were completely unrelated to the current task. For instance, a set for square objects might persist when switching to a set for red objects, and vice versa. Perhaps it is only when two sets are in direct competition (as in the present experiments) that the previous attentional set is "flushed" completely. The current experiments touched on this issue by comparing task-irrelevant color singletons in the distractor color (ignored in the target display) and color singletons in the neutral color (never selected against in the target display). We reasoned that the attention setting might be explicitly tuned to exclude the distractor color in the target displays that needs to be ignored but not the neutral color, which does not have a similar need to be selected against. If so, then one would expect larger cuing validity effects with the neutral-color cue stimulus than the distractor-color cue stimulus. The present data clearly did not support this prediction. In a similar vein, one might expect that abrupt onsets, which do not need to be generically ignored (especially given that the target itself is an abrupt onset), would also capture attention. The data did not support this prediction either. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that attention control settings explicitly exclude only those stimuli that pose a threat to performance.
Another possibility is that salient stimuli are better able to draw attention during periods of time when the current task poses a lower attention demand. Perhaps the desire to respond as rapidly as possible leads participants to adopt an extremely narrow attentional state achieved only intermittently in the real world. There is some anecdotal evidence for greater attentional capture by taskirrelevant stimuli when current processing demands are less intense (as when casually surfing the Internet). It should be possible to design laboratory conditions that would properly test this possibility.
Relation to Traditional Task-Switching Studies
The present study required participants to switch between different attentional control settings. The task-switching literature has typically shown that there are costs (indexed by an increase in RT and error rate) associated with switching between two different tasks. These costs are especially large-often several hundred milliseconds-when the stimulus display affords the execution of both active task sets (known as dual-affordance stimuli or bivalent stimuli; see Monsell & Driver, 2000, for a review). Note that the present target displays contained both colors that might be looked for across trials and thus they also had the affordances for both active tasks. In the task-switching literature, dual-affordance taskswitching paradigms typically produce much large switch costs (often several hundred milliseconds) than single affordance paradigms. Nevertheless, our observed switch costs were relatively small, only 41 ms in Experiment 2 and 29 ms in Experiment 3. It appears that dual-affordance (bivalence) alone is not sufficient to produce large switch costs.
Why were the costs in Experiments 2 and 3 so small, rather than in the range typical for traditional dual-affordance task-switching studies? One explanation is that participants were required to switch between two features within the same dimension (e.g., red and green in the color dimension). Once the letter in the target color was identified, the remainder of the task used the same stimulus-response mapping rule on all trials (pressing the left key for the letter L and the right key for the letter T). In the traditional task-switching paradigm, however, people are asked to switch between two tasks with different mapping rules (e.g., an odd/even task on a digit vs. a less-than/greater-than five task on a digit). Thus, it can be argued that switching costs in our paradigm are small because no actual change of task (S-R mapping rule) is required, only a change in how to select the object to which that rule is applied.
Task-switching studies sometimes do require a switch in the target-defining feature as well as the S-R mapping rule (e.g., Lien, Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2005) , but not always. We believe that the small size of switch costs found in Experiments 2 and 3 thus implies that the principal difficulty in task-switching studies stems not from uploading the new target-defining feature (changing the control settings for spatial attention) but rather from retrieving and applying new stimulus-response mapping rules (changing the settings at a more central level).
Capture by Salient but Irrelevant Objects
The primary aim of our study was to determine whether switching top-down control settings increases the vulnerability of the attentional system to capture by salient objects that do match attention control settings. It is important, however, to also ask whether, on average, there was any evidence of capture based on pure salience. The present ensemble of experiments has unusually large samples of participants, so it is well suited to detecting small effects. Experiment 1, where the top-down control settings were fixed throughout the whole experiment, did produce positive cue validity effects (9 ms) indicating some degree of capture by cue stimuli mismatching control settings. This result supports the claim that top-down settings are not necessarily strong enough to completely prevent attentional capture by objects favored by salience but not matching the desired attention control settings.
At the same time, it is important to also acknowledge that in Experiment 1, the cuing validity effects from these salient, irrelevant stimuli were only a small fraction of the cuing validity effects from the color singletons did match the target color (56 ms). A further caveat is that, considered individually, the later Experiments 2, 3, and 4 produced smaller and less reliable capture for cue stimuli that did not match the to-be-looked-for target color. After pooling data from all participants in all four of the present experiments, the average cuing validity effect from salient-butirrelevant stimuli was nonsignificant, with a 95% confidence interval of 3 Ϯ 5 ms. Thus, the present study provides rather underwhelming support for the ability of salient stimuli to overcome a lack of top-down support.
Limitations of the Present Study
The cue stimuli used in the present experiments (color singletons and abrupt onsets) are commonly cited as examples of salient stimuli and have been reported by many previous studies to have the power to capture attention (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992; Theeuwes, 1991 Theeuwes, , 1994 Theeuwes, & Burger, 1998) . In the present study, however, RTs showed little evidence for attentional capture by these salient stimuli when they lacked the feature that participants were looking for to find the target letter. One could argue, however, that perhaps the irrelevant color singleton or abrupt onset captured attention initially (e.g., Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000) , but then attention was redirected to a neutral position before the target display, so the capture produced no observable slowdown in RT (or any measure derived from RT, such as our cue validity effect size).
Although our method used a relatively short interval between the cue onset and target onset of only 150 ms (see Remington et al., 1992) , this "rapid disengagement" hypothesis remains logically possible. However, a recent electrophysiological study by Lien et al. (2008) provides evidence that abrupt onsets do not cause even an initial momentary shift of attention. In that study, the authors measured a component of the event-related potential (ERP) called the N2pc effect (short for N2-posteriorcontralateral). This component is an increased negativity over posterior scalp contralateral to an attended stimulus, peaking about 200 to 300 ms after the onset of that stimulus (see Luck & Hillyard, 1990 , 1994 Woodman & Luck, 2003) . The N2pc effect, quantified as the average difference between contralateral and ipsilateral voltage, can thus be used as a moment-tomoment index of the deployment of spatial attention to lateralized visual objects without overt oculomotor movement. Lien et al. (2008) instructed participants to look for a target letter (L or T) in a particular color (red or green). The cue display in their Experiment 2 contained one target-color object and one distractor-color object. Because the target display always contained a target-color singleton and a distractor-color singleton, the singleton search mode could not be used to find the desired target (in contrast to Hickey et al., 2006 , where singleton detection mode was feasible). Lien et al. found converging lines of evidence (e.g., substantial cuing validity effects and N2pc effects) indicating that attention was captured only by cue stimuli matching the to-be-looked-for target color. Critically, the same result was found in their Experiment 3, when a target-color cue stimulus was pitted against a simultaneous abrupt onset. The N2pc data showed no sign that the abrupt onset ever succeeded in drawing attention away from the targetcolor cue stimulus, even temporarily.
A recent electrophysiological study by Lien, Ruthruff, and Cornett (in press) provides further evidence against the hypothesis that salient stimuli momentarily capture attention, followed by rapid disengagement. They presented a color singleton cue before a target display. The color singleton cue came in three colors, as in the current study: the target color, the distractor color (that also appeared in the target display), or neutral color (never appearing as either the target or distractor color in the target display). Because the N2pc effect provides a continuous index of attentional allocation, even an initial shift of attention, followed by rapid disengagement, could potentially have been detected. However, the electrophysiological records showed no evidence that the color singletons elicited an N2pc effect unless they had the to-be-looked-for target color.
Conclusion
The present study breaks important new ground examining the strength of attentional control when settings vary from trial to trial rather than remaining fixed over a session. One might expect that attentional control settings would be much stronger when they are fixed than when they vary frequently. On this view, the need to switch top-down control settings should weaken attentional control, leaving the attentional control system more vulnerable to bottom-up capture by salient stimuli that do not match what is being looked for. No such weakening of attention control was found. Regardless of whether the current target-defining feature repeated or switched, salient stimuli (such as color singletons or abrupt onsets) generally failed to capture attention involuntarily, unless they happened to match the top-down attentional settings (reflecting what participants were looking for). Quantitatively, the level of attentional control was remarkably equivalent for fixed and varying settings, and remarkably equivalent for repeat and switch trials.
These surprising findings greatly extend the scope of applicability of the contingent capture hypothesis, showing that it applies even to situations (common in the real world) that require frequent changes to control settings. Although the current research did not succeed in finding the boundary conditions beyond which the contingent capture hypothesis fails, it remains plausible that such boundary conditions exist, and it is important to continue looking for them using a wide variety of stimuli, tasks, and paradigms.
